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SUMMARY: In "The Reflex Are Concept in Psychology" (1986), John Dewey
gives a reconstruction of the reflex arc concept which forms the starting point
of a 'transactional paradigm' which is fundamental for all aspects of Dewey's
work. In this article we Start with a reconstruction of Dewey's paradigm. Next
we show that Bowlby's attachment theory fits very well within such a transac-
tional paradigm because it is based on ethology. A closer analysis, however,
shows that the place of the mental in attachment theory is not completely
consistent with the evolutionary assumptions of the transactional paradigm,
and it issuggcsted that this problem can be solved from a Deweyan perspective.
Introduction
In 1896 John Dewey's "The Reflex Arc Concept in Psychology" was
published (Psychological Review, 3, July 1896, 357-370; EWS^ö-lOg2). This
article has not only been considered a crucial Step in the development of
Dewey's thinking (cf. Bernstein, 1966, p. 15; Hahn, 1969, p. 27; Smith, 1973,
p. 122; Slccpcr, 1986, p. 21; Alexander, 1987, p. 41), but also an important step
in the development of psychology (cf. Langfeld, 1943; Murphy, 1961, p. 27,29;
McKenzie, 1975, p. xiv-xv). In this article Dewey criticizes the way the
physiological idea of the reflex arc is used in psychology. The alternative view
of behavior and the explanation for behavior that Dewey develops, is almost
unanimously considered to be the starting point for functionalism in psychol-
ogy (cf. Titchener, 1898, p. 451; Langfeld, 1943, p. 148; Flügel, 1964, p. 194;
Bernstein, 1966, p. 15; Phillips, 1971, p. 566; Eisenga, 1973, p. 102; Verbeek,
1977, p. 141; Lcahey, 1987, p. 270-271).
We shall draw on this article to introduce Dewey's position and give an
evaluation of its topicality. We shall then confront Dewey's ideas with some
aspects of John Bowlby's attachment theory. It should become apparent that
Dewey has formulated the paradigm within which attachment theory can be
placed. Looking at attachment theory from a Deweyan perspective enables
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one to indicate which elements in the theoretical framework of attachment
theory need further elaboration and how this might best be approached.
The Reflex Are Concept in Psychology and Dewey's Critique
By thc end of the nineteenth Century psychologists were convinced that
it was possible to overcome the dualistic presuppostions of associationist
psychology. Physiology had provided the structural unit of afferent nervcs,
central nervous System and efferent nerves. Psychologists transposed this unit
ofstructure into a unit oifitnction of peripheral Stimulus, central processing
and motor response. This 'reflex arc' model was thought sufficient to explain
human behavior (cf. Smith, 1973). The model resolved both the mattcr-form
dualism ('Sensation' and 'idea') of associationist psychology (by locating sen-
sations and ideas in one process), and the body-mind dualism (by taking the
mind to be the processes in the brain). Human behavior could now bc
explained from the physical, anatomical structure which meant that no essen-
tial distinction between animal and human behavior was to bc made. The
model was, therefore, in agreement with the theory of evolution.
In his article Dewey expresses the opmion that by using the idea of the
reflex arc concept in psychology "the principles of explanation and classifica-
tion which the reflex arc idea has replaced (...) are not sufficiently displaced"
(EW5:96). According to Dewey "(t)he older dualism between Sensation and
idea is rcpeated in thc current dualism of peripheral and central structures
and functions; the oldcr dualism of body and soul finds a distinct echo in the
current dualism between Stimulus and response." (EW5:96). This is caused
by thc fact that the sensori-motor circuit or System is interpreted from
"prcconceived and preformulated ideas of rigid distinctions between sensa-
tions, thoughts and acts." (EW5:97). As a result psychological theory-build-
ing Starts with "disjomtcd parts" and must then attempt to explain how thc
separate parts work together or interact. In Dewey's opinion attcmpts to
explain thc interaction either by introducing an "extra-experimental soul" or
by giving an explanation in terms of "mechanical push and pull" (EW5:100),
must be refuted bccause they contradict the biological-evolutionary points of
departure which form the basic assumptions both of physiological psychology
and of Dewey himself.3
Becausc the theory of evolution "include(s) man under the same
gcncrali/ation with othcr facts of nature" (EW1:210), an ontological dualism
that prcsupposes two substanccs (mind and body) is impossiblc. This mcans
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that an "extra-experimental soul" does not fit into a physiologically based
psychological theory.
Dewey also rejects the idea of "mechanical push and pull," because it
presupposes an organism at rest that can only be activated by Stimuli from the
cnvironment. This notion of an isolated, autonomous organism is also con-
tradictory to the theory of evolution. "The idea of environment is a necessity
to the idea of organisms, and with the conception of environment comes the
impossibility of considering psychical life äs an individual, isolated thing
developing in a vacuum." (EW1:56). Organism and environment are not
from the outset two autonomous entities. "Only by analysis and selective
abstraction can we differentiate the actual occurrence into two factors, one
called organism and the other, environment." (LW5:220). This implies that
the organism cannot be considered äs an organism-at-rest, having a complete-
ly rested, neutral and unpreoccupied Status. "(T)he state of the organism is
one ofaction which is continuous" (LW5:223). It is against this background
that Dewey reconstructs the reflex arc concept.
Co-ordination
An adequate psychological use of the reflex arc idea should not Start with
disjointed parts, but has to begin with an organic unity. "What is wanted is
that sensory Stimulus, central connections and motor responses shall be
viewed ... äs divisions of labor, functioning factors, within the single concrete
whole, now designated the reflex arc" (EW5:97). "The process all the way
around is assumed to be the unit" Dewey writes (in a letter to Angell; see
Coughlan, 1975, p. 139). According to Dewey "this reality may most con-
vcniently be termed co-ordination." (EW5:97).
Dewey gives a reinterpretation of "the familiär child-candle instance"
from James' Principles ofPsychology to demonstrate how he is using the term
co-ordination. "The ordinary Interpretation would say the Sensation of light
is the Stimulus to the grasping äs a response, the burn resulting is a Stimulus
to withdrawing the hand äs response and so on." (EW5:97). But, from a
psychological point of view, this analysis is inadequate. "Upon analysis, we
find that we begin not with a sensory Stimulus, but with a sensori-motor
co-ordination, the optical-ocular, and that in a certain sense it is the move-
ment of body, head and eye muscles determining the quality of what is
cxperienced. In other words, the real beginning is with the act of seeing; it is
looking, and not a Sensation of light." (EW5:97). On the basis of this analysis
Dewey concludes that "both Sensation and movement lie inside, not outside
the act" (EW5:98). Dewey is also using the term co-ordination in a more
cncompassing sense. With the stimulus-response analysis the whole process
of seeing light — reaching for it — burning the hand — withdrawing the hand,
can only be characterized äs "the replacing of one sort of experience by
anothcr" (EW5:99). Only a fragmentary account of the state of affairs can be
given. Dewey, however, is able to show the connection between these sequen-
tial acts using the concept of co-ordination (see also EW5:99).
The Status of the Mental
It may seem that the concept of co-ordination must be considered a
mental capacity because of the way in which Dewey uses the term. Such an
assumption would imply that the mental retains a central position in Dewey's
philosophy. This is, however, not the case. Dewey wants to do two things. On
the one hand he wants to formulate a monistic psychology, because in a
psychology consistent with the principles of evolutionary theory there can be
no place for an ontological dualism between mind and matter. On the other
hand Dewey wants to incorporate the mental into his psychology. The only
way to solve this is to show the continuity between (primary) physiological
processes and (secondary) mental functions. Dewey provides two arguments
which sustain this conclusion. Firstly, he shows that the principle of co-
ordination can be applied both to the most fundamental physiological level
and to the more complcx mental level. Secondly, he shows how the devclop-
mcnt from the fundamental (i.e., physiological) processes of co-ordination to
the more differcntiated (i.e., mental) processes of co-ordination should be
conceivcd.
Co-ordination is primarily a physiological process. Dewey typifics the
'primary quality' of the organism äs "movement äs seif sustaining through
sclection and assimilation of environment" (EW5:304). Within the organism
a "specialization of labor" takes place with a "consequent need of interrelat-
ing or co-ordinating structure". That co-ordinating structure is the nervous
System. "(T)hc nervous System has one primary inclusive function: co-ordina-
tion of specialized activities to a common end." (EW5:308). In the process of
evolutionary developmcnt Dewey distinguishes between an "increasing ränge
of co-ordination," "co-ordination of movements with each other" and "co-
ordination of movements with sensory aclivities." Within this latter modus of
co-ordination, Dewey distinguishes between "(a) reflex action, (b) instinct, (c)
formed habit, (d) delibcrative activity" (EW5:307)4. Where Dewey uscs the
term "delibcrative," mental capacities (i.e., thinking) are first introduced.
Thought plays no role at the level of 'reflex action' and 'instinct' and this is
also the casc with 'formed habits'. "Thought arises in conflict of activities,
through the need of striking a balance, that is, of discovering the course of
action which wil l rcconcile a number of conflicting minor activities"
Dewey uscs the principle of co-ordination also in an even more extensive sense. In his course on
Educational Psychology (1896) he distinguishes stages in child development; each stage is
characterized by its own 'co-ordinatory taste' (EW5:310-311). At the level of adolescence Dewey
speaks of "The Co-ordination of Onc's Activity äs a Whole with That of Othcrs in Society
(HW5:311).
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(EW5:314). So Dewey givcs thought a function in situations in which the
continuity of action is at risk, in those situations in which it is not clear "what
kind of responses the organism shall make" (Dewey, 1938, p. 107).
Dewey's Transactional Paradigm
Dewey typifies human behavior äs a biological-physiological process of
co-ordination, a continuing attunement of organism and environment to each
other äs a result of which both the organism and the environment change in
ordcr to realise a Situation of optimal adaptation. The word Optimal' might
suggest that Dewey holds that it is possible to state which adaptation is
absolutely optimal. Dewey, however, keeps telling us that both organism and
environment change. So there cannot be one state of the organism that will
always guarantee an optimal 'fit'. The activities of the organism bring about
changes in the environment which in turn can disturb the state of equilibrium
reached. Optimal' must be seen äs strictly situational. In attachment theory
a similar idea can be found in Hinde, who suggests that there is a ränge of
behavioral stratcgies for adapting to different niches (cf. Hinde, 1982b).
According to Dewey, the process of co-ordination becomes increasingly
complcx and encompassing. Mental functions originale wiihin this process
and fulfil a function in the increasing refinement of the ever more complex
and encompassing processes of co-ordination. Dewey does not place the
mental alongside the physical (äs had been the case in psychology before
Dewey) but neither does he deny the mental (äs would become the case in
psychology after Dewey). Dewey's functionalism does not stop at just indicat-
ing the function of thinking in the process of (evolutionary) adaptation (a sort
of functionalism that, e.g., can be found in Titchener, 1898). Dewey shows
that thinking is one of the functions of the organism; a function that has
developed in the ongoing process of'interaction' just äs, for example, can be
said of the digestive System.
While psychology (and philosophy) before Dewey had drawn heavily on
concepts such äs 'mind' and 'consciousness', the introduction of evolutionary
ideas leads to a shift of attention from 'mind' to the interaction of organism
and environment. "The old center was mind ... The new center is indefinite
interactions ..." is Dewey's summary of this 'Copernican Revolution' (cf.
LW4:232).
As we have citcd above: "Only by analysis and selcctive abstraction can
we differentiate the actual occurrence into two faclors, one called the or-
ganism and the othcr, environment." (LW5:220). Bccause of the fact that the
tcrm 'interaction' implics two separate entitites, Dewey, in his later works,
prcfers to use the tcrm 'transaction' to denote the initial totality within which,
from a certain perspcctivc and for certain reasons, organism and environment
can be distinguishcd (cf. Dewey & Bentley, 1960, p. 122-124).
, 216 Kecent Trends in l heoreticai rsycnoiugy n
Bowlby's Attachment Theory: 'Behavior Systems' and 'Control
Theory'
Bowlby's attachment theory is an ethological theory (Bowlby, 1988, p. 1)
based upon "analytical biology and control theory, which together have
elucidated the basic principles that underlie adaptive, goal-directed behavior"
(Bowlby, 1982, p. 37). Ethology departs from the principles of evolutionary
theory. Bowlby praises ethology for not only studying the morphological and
physiological characteristics of animals from the Darwinian framework of
adaptation-for-survival, but also their 'behavioral equipment' (cf. Bowlby,
1982, p. 54-55).
One of the central concepts in Bowlby's theory is the ethological concept
'behavior System'. A behavior System is a System postulated to explain be-
havior by thinking of more complex behavior äs a compilation of, and
cooperation between, more simple behaviors. The concept "is used in an
explanatory sense to refer to Systems postulated äs controlling behavior"
(Hinde, 1982b, p. 62). With the help of this concept, explanations of behavior
are given in which there are "lower-level Systems controlling behavioral acts,"
"control Systems postulated to explain interrelations between the several
types of behavior" and "higher-order control Systems" (Hinde, 1982b, p. 66).
Bowlby elaborates on this (hierarchically ordered) classification of behavior
and behavior Systems by differentiating (in increasing order of complexity)
"rcflexes," "fixed action patterns" and behavior in which "a fixed action
pattcrn is combined with a simple sequence that is dependent on feedback
from the environment" (Bowlby, 1982, p. 67). Bowlby notes that "just äs therc
are many different types of behavioral Systems so there are a number of
diffcrent ways in which their activities can be co-ordinated" (Bowlby, 1982,
p. 74). Various more or less 'elementary' behavioral acts are observed and are
thcn placcd in a coherent System. This systematization is based on the
function that more elementary behavior performs in reaching a certain goal,
and providcs the means by which ethology tries to explain behavior.
While in the more elementary 'behavior Systems', patterns of behavior
are such that thcy go 'straight for the goal', in the case of more complex
behaviors (and the corresponding more complex behavior Systems) principles
of 'control theory' are introduced. The main concepts of control theory are
'setting', 'set-goal' and 'feedback' (Bowlby, 1982, p. 43). In the case of, for
example, a thermostat the sct-goal is keeping the temperature at a certain
Icvel and the setting is the actual temperature that is wanted. While in the
case of a thermostat the 'setting' has to be instituted by a human bcing, it is
also possible to envisage a System which reccives its setting from anothcr
System. Bowlby gives the example of automatic anti-aircraft guns which
rcccive their Information from a radar-screcn (cf. Bowlby, 1982, p. 44). It is
Bowlby's opinion that "this type of System is rcplicated in living organisms"
(Bowlby, 1982, p. 44). Which behavior system must be activatcd in what way,
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depends on the comparison between the current Situation and the Situation
that is wanted; a comparison in which 'feedback' plays an important part.
Bretherton (1985) pointed out that the attachmcnt behavior System must not
be seen äs a system-at-rest that is switched on to reach the set-goal and is
switched off when the set-goal is reached. According to Bretherton the
attachment behavior System is always active in coordinating different sub-
systems to reach and maintain the set-goal.
When control theory Starts to play a role in the ethological explanation
of behavior, cognitive capacities make their entry. It is evident that "ultimate-
ly 'goal-directed' behaviour must imply that the animal has some model or
correlate of the goal Situation before that Situation is achieved, and the
behavior is governed by the discrepancy between current and goal situations.
(...) An internal correlate of the goal can, but need not, imply cognitive
abilities on the part of the animal" (Hinde, 1982a, p. 76). According to Hinde
the hesitation of ethologists to introduce cognitive powers in explaining
"complex social behaviour of higher mammals" is understandable but inap-
propriate. This hesitation has led, unfortunately, to "the neglect of many
interesting phenomena" (Hinde, 1982a, p. 76-78).
Bowlby assumes that behavior Systems are adapted to the environment
in which they originated because they are the product of the evolutionary
process of Variation and selection. This means that nowadays behavior sys-
tems can only function adequately in a Situation that does not differ too much
from the original 'environment of evolutionary adaptation' (cf. Bowlby, 1982,
p. 47; Bowlby does not make clear what he means exactly by 'too much'). This
implies that the organism must be able to recognize certain characteristics of
(or characteristic patterns in) the environment. So, according to Bowlby, we
must presuppose that "the individual organism has a copy of that pattern in
its CNS and is structured to react in special kinds of ways when it perceives a
matching pattern in the environment and in other kinds of ways when it
perceives no such pattern" (Bowlby, 1982, p. 48). "(A)s well äs having equip-
ment that enables thcm to recognise special parts of their environment,
members of all bul the most primitive phyla are possessed of equipment that
enables them to organise such Information äs they have about the world into
Schemata or maps" (Bowlby, 1982, p. 48). Bowlby prefers to speak of a
'working model' instead of a 'cognitive map', because the latter is a too static
concept (cf. Bowlby, 1982, p. 80). The individual can, äs it were, look at,
change and adjust the model and can use the model äs a reference to plan his
actions. The notion of "a model in the brain is that it constitutes a toy that is
yet a tool, an imitation world, which we can manipulate in the way that will
suit us best, and so find out how to manipulate the real world, which it is
supposed to represcnt" (Bowlby, 1982, p. 80). By the use of language we can
exchange our working models so that we need not re-invent the whecl over
and over again.
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So in Bowlby's elaboration of attachment theory two cognitive abilities
are postulated: "(a) a means of receiving and storing instructions regarding
the set-goal, and (b) a means of comparing the effects of performance with
instruction and changing performance of it" (Bowlby, 1982, p. 70).
Discussion
A comparison of Dewey's ideas with attachment theory shows that both
depart from evolutionary theory. In both cases we also find a similar strategy
for the explanation of behavior: complex behavior is explained by seeing it äs
a co-ordinated composition of more elementary behavior, and elementary
behavior is in the end viewed äs biological-physiological. From this we can
conclude that the 'paradigm' for explaining behavior Dewey formulated
around the turn of the Century has, in the last two or thrce decades, led to a
flourishing research-program, especially since the introduction of ethology
into psychology.
Dewey's significance lies in the fact that he has shown that an elaboration
of (monistic) evolutionary principlcs need not imply that there is no place for
mental 'faculties' in the explanation of human behavior. On the contrary: the
mental must be considered äs real äs the material (the physiological). There
is no argument for viewing certain 'results' of the proccss of evolutionary
devclopment (äs, e.g., the mental, but also language and culturc) äs having a
lower Status or äs being Icss relevant to the process of adaptation and change
than othcr 'results' (äs, e.g., reflexes or the digestive System).
When we apply Dewey's elaboration of the evolutionary principlcs to
attachment theory, we are led to the conclusion that the latter is unclear on
the issue of the Status of the mental. Whilst attachment theory considcrs the
physiological-biological level to be real, it is often the case that äs soon äs
mental functions are introduccd in explaining behavior, recourse is made to
the levcl of explanation. Ethology wants to explain behavior by postulating
behavior Systems. Hindc dcscribes an attachment behavior System äs "a
System postulated äs controlling the scveral types of attachment behavior"
(Hinde, 1982b, p. 64). Tb bc able to explain more 'complex' behavior, the
principles of control theory are applied. Exactly at the point at which those
principlcs are introduccd, mental capacities arcpresupposed in order to arrive
at an adequatc explanation.
In attachment theory, thcn, there is a differcncc betwcen the ways in
which the physiological and the mental level are discussed. This diffcrcnce
can be partly traccd to a diffcrencc betwecn description and explanation. But
In Iheorclical psychology there is also a reassessmcnt of Dewey's ideas. See, for cxample,
Natsoulas (1983) who discusses the way in which the concepls 'conscious' and 'consciousness'
should be used and clahorates cxplicilly on ideas Dewcy formulatcd äs early äs 1906 (see Dewey,
1906).
Dewey and Attachment Theory
besides the fact that, from a philosophical point of view, the validity of such a
rigid distinction between description and (theoretical) explanation can be
questioned, Dewey has shown us that in this case there is no need to make any
such distinction. Moreover, any such distinction is contrary to the evolution-
ary principles subscribed to by attachment theory.
We conclude that further research needs to be done into the ways in
which the mental is used in attachment theory. We think that a Deweyan
perspective might be helpful in realizing a more adequate conceptualization
of the mental. A reconceptualization is not only necessary for theoretical
reasons, that is, to get a theory that is consistent with its basic evolutionary
assumptions. But also, to the extent to which attachment theory ascribes to
mental capacitics a direct influence on behavior, a more adequate and consis-
tent way of viewing these capacities can contribute to the practical relevance
of attachment theory.
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